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IV

ARGUMENT

A.

There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Bank was a bona fide lender.
Although the Bank contends in its Respondent's Brief that it has "set forth ample

evidence establishing that at the time it obtained and recorded the Deeds of Trust, it was unaware
of the Harrises' claims against the Subject Real Property" (Respondent's Brief, page 15), the
evidence points to facts creating genuine disputes as to the Bank's notice.
Contrary to the Bank's assertion on page 16 of its Respondent's Brief that the Harrises
must prove two specific elements to defeat the Bank's contention that it was a good faith
encumbrancer, the law directs otherwise. As noted in the Harrises' Appellants' Brief, good faith
"means lack of actual or constructive knowledge .... " Benz v. D. L. Evans Bank, 37814
(IDSCCI)(January 25, 2012).
The district court below did not properly apply the standard for summary judgment when
considering the question of the Bank's good faith and notice. The Harrises set forth numerous
facts demonstrating genuine factual issues pertaining to the Bank's actual, constructive and
inquiry notice. Nor did the district court below properly construe all such facts, and liberally
apply all inferences from such facts in favor of the Harrises. I.R.C.P. 56.
The trial court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

Tolmie Farms v. JR. Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 607, 609, 862 P.2d 299, 301 (1993); Doe v.
Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986). If reasonable people could reach
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion must be
denied. Featherston v. Allstate Insurance Co., 125 Idaho 840, 842,875 P.2d 937, 939 (1994).
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Refuting completely the Bank's claim that it acted without notice of the Harrises' adverse
claim to and interests in the subject property are the following glaring facts. Prior to the
recording of the first admittedly invalid quitclaim deed from Darryl Harris to the Yost Trust, the
Bank had requested and received a title report dated November 7, 2008. That title report showed
the Harrises were the owners of the subject property. Despite the clear notice contained in that
report, the Bank had the Yosts execute a deed of trust relating to the subject property. The Bank
then recorded that deed of trust. Thus, the Bank asserted an encumbrance against the subject
property at a time when it knew the Harrises were the titled owners and the Yosts had not title
interest in the subject property.
Further, the Bank wholly avoids in its brief mentioning any of the facts that it relied upon
Yost's financial statements to support the signature loans it had made to Yost. Yost's financial
statements manifest that his financial strength was 90% or more due to his interest in Palmer's
Trigon or related entities.
The Bank states it "had no reason to suspect that Palmer was dishonest and that Trigon
was a Ponzi scheme because the Bank never made any loans to Palmer or Trigon and never held
any accounts owned by them." (Respondent's Brief, page 18). The Bank pretends that hiding its
head in the sand protects it from facts of which it had notice that Palmer's actions were suspect
and that Yost's net worth based on Trigon's heralded financial strength demanded further
scrutiny.
Knowing that Yost was part of Palmer's Trigon business, the Bank asked Yost to have
Palmer demonstrate with documents Trigon's financial position. Obviously, in making such a
request, the Bank suspected both Palmer and TrigoR Indeed, the Bank had notice that some of its
customers had experienced insufficient funds checks written on Trigon's account. Accepting the
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Bank's request, Yost arranged for Palmer to meet with the Bank. Palmer brought in his purported
financial documents. The Bank reviewed Palmer's documents but could not understand them.
Additionally, prior to recording its deeds of trust with Yost, another customer of the Bank
involved with Trigon presented to the Bank the contrived statement Palmer had created claiming
that the Bank of America held millions of dollars for Trigon. The Bank recognized that the
statement and the electronic message given when the listed telephone number was called were
dubious.
During the summer of 2008 Yost was in default of his signature loan at the Bank. Yost's
explanation for the default was the absence of cash flow from Trigon. It was only after Yost's
default in payment of his loans that the Bank pressured Yost to come up with collateral to secure
the Bank's position, including obtaining title to the subject property.
Seeking safe harbor in the bay of self-imposed ignorance, the Bank sidesteps the actual
notice, constructive notice, and inquiry notice of facts and information defeating its status as a
good faith encumbrancer. The Bank was on notice of facts demanding its reasonable diligence to
investigate the true nature of the title to the subject property and Yost's connection to a clearly
questionably investment scheme. The Bank's election to ignore facts does not save it from its
legally imposed duty to investigate. Hill v. FederalLand Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d 789,
791 (1938); Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, 558 P.2d 1026 (1976); Farrell v. Brown, 111
Idaho 1027, 729 P.2d 1090 (Ct.App. 1986).
There are genuine issues of material fact concerning the Bank's status as a good faith
encumbrancer. The district court erred in granting summary judgment in the Bank's favor on its
claim of being a good faith encumbrancer.
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B.

Lack of Consideration.

Parol Evidence

Relying upon Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170,898 P.2d 1081 (1995), the Bank contends the
Hcrrrises did not present any admissible evidence to contradict the clear language of the corrected
quitclaim deed. As in the district court, the BcUlk's reliance on Bliss is misplaced.
Prefatorily, it is important to note that the district court correctly rejected as a matter of
law the Bank's position that parol evidence was inadmissible to challenge the language of the
corrected quitclaim deed.
The court in Bliss based its holding entirely upon Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777
P.2d 255 (1989). Hall did not deal with the issue of lack of consideration. Instead, the issue in
Hall was whether transfer of a deed was in part gift rather than for value. Unquestionably, Hall

and Bliss address whether parol evidence is admissible to challenge unambiguous language in a
deed pertaining to the parties' intent and not whether parol evidence is admissible to prove lack
of consideration.
Both Hall and Bliss were distinguished for their limited application in Barrett v. Barrett,
149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799 (2010). In Barrett the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Although the trial court's interpretation of Hall and Bliss is understandable, we
conclude that the language of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does
not conclusively determine the character of property for purposes of a divorce
action. Rather, the intention of the party or parties executing the deed is
dispositive. Thus, neither I.e. § 55-606 nor the statute of frauds governs because
the pertinent question is not the effectiveness of the deed. Although the trial
judge, as the finder of fact, may consider a deed as evidence in determining intent,
it is not the only evidence available to a judge considering the question of
transmutation.
Id. at 24.
More important, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that where consideration for a deed
is material to the issues, evidence of consideration is admissible. Consideration is not an issue
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dealing with intent as expressed in the language of a deed. Consideration is the main factor for
determining validity of the grant and delivery of a deed. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179
P.3d 303 (2008); Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension
Fund, 128 Idaho 539, 916 P.2d 1264 (1996)(lack of consideration may result in voiding of deed);
McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho 313,272 P.2d 298 (1954).

Consequently, parol evidence is admissible. The uncontroverted testimony of Duane Yost
and Darryl Harris established no consideration was given for the corrected quitclaim deed.
Lack of Consideration

Without factual basis, the Bank mischaracterizes the bargained for consideration for the
subject property between the Harrises and Yost. The Bank opines that the consideration was a
mutual exchange of promises. The facts prove otherwise.
As part of an overall development plan, Yost was to pay

not merely promise to pay -

the Harrises the sum of $800,000. In tum, the Harrises would convey to Yost title to the subject
property; which property Yost, in tum, would convey to the development company.
Acting on that agreement, Yost actually caused a transfer of what he thought was
$800,000 from his Trigon account to the Harrises'Trigon account. Of course, as shown by the
Affidavit of Wayne Klein, that transfer was purely paper and fiction. Nonetheless, Yost testified
that believed he had fully performed by paying the Harrises the consideration of $800,000.
The district court erroneously construed Yost's transfer of funds from his Trigon account
to the Harrises' Trigon account as actual consideration because the Harrises had the "right to
withdraw" those funds. In fact, the court concluded that the Harrises mt!st have received funds
from Yost because the "Harrises received, or had access to, at least some ofthe $800,000. Again,
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the district court misperceived the entirely false nature of the accounts Palmer "generated" in
Trigon.
Palmer did not actually have "accounts" for his investors in Trigon. His accounting
merely represented as Klein described "investment credits." There was no actual cash. Palmer
was operating a Ponzi scheme and any money paid to investors was taken from other investors.
When Yost caused a transfer of $800,000 from his Trigon account to the Harrises' Trigon
account, no actual funds were transferred. Although Yost may have believed his transfer of
money was payment to the Harrises for the subject property, there was in fact no payment made.
No consideration was given. Accordingly, Yost correctly testified in his deposition that in light
of the fraud Palmer had committed Yost paid no consideration to the Harrises.
The Bank urges a determination that the actual consideration for the subject property was
Yost's promise to pay $800,000. There was no such promise. Nor do the facts support a finding
that the bargained for consideration was Yost's promise to pay.
Rather, the facts amply demonstrate that Yost believed he had paid $800,000 to the
Harrises, not that he merely promised to pay. The Bank's reliance on the false notion that Yost's
consideration was in the form of his promise to pay is wholly refuted by Yost's testimony,
Yost's payment of $800,000 by transfer between Trigon accounts, and the actual bargained for
consideration agreed to by the Harrises.
In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment, the district court reached an
incorrect determination that Yost must have paid some consideration to the Harrises because the
Harrises had received or had access to some funds in their Trigon account. The Harrises then
moved for reconsideration supported with the affidavit of Wayne Klein. Klein's affidavit made it
plain that the "investment credits" Yost transferred to the Harrises was nothing more than paper.
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Faced with Klein's affidavit, the district court nevertheless determined Yost gave some
consideration and, thus, there was a failure of consideration instead of lack of consideration. The
district court erred. The district court's judgment should be reversed.
Void Deed alld Good Faith Ellcumbrallcer

The Bank asserts three cases from other states support its position that even if there was a
lack of consideration it is protected as a bona fide encumbrancer for value. The Bank's position
is unsound.
First, the Bank cites Goodwin v. City of Dallas, 496 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
Texas appellate courts have held that a mere lack of consideration is generally not enough to
void a deed. Watson v. Tipton, 274 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009). In addition to lack
of consideration there must be fraud or undue influence in obtaining the deed. Uriarte v. Prieto,
606 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1st Dist. 1980).
The decisions from Texas are not in line with the abundant authority cited by the Harrises
in their Appellant's Brief establishing that lack of consideration renders a deed void, not merely
voidable. As noted in the Appellant's Brief, Idaho courts have acknowledged, albeit directly
decided, that lack of consideration would render a deed void. The Bank has offered no
authorities challenging the majority view as set forth in the Appellant's Brief.
Second, the Bank cites First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, NA.
Sheridan, 762 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1988). However, the Bank failed to set out the full ruling of the

court in First Interstate Bank.
Wyoming has long recognized the defense of bona fide purchaser for value and
the protections to which such a purchaser is entitled. Accordingly, the only
question we need answer in disposing of this case is whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Bank was a bona fide
purchaser.
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A bona fide purchaser is protected against infirmities in a deed which would
render the deed voidable. The infirmities alleged by appellant fall into this
category. While a void deed cannot pass title even infavor of an innocent
purchaser or a bonafide encumbrancer for value, a deed only voidable can pass
title and be relied upon and enforced by a bona fide purchaser.
Id., 762 P.2d at 384 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, First Interstate Bank provides no support for the Bank's position. Instead, it
clearly suppOlis the Harrises' position that a void deed cannot pass title even in favor of a good
faith encumbrancer.
Third, the Bank seeks authoritative support from Brown v. Johnson, 11 So.2d 713
(La.App. 2 Cir.1942). Louisiana does not recognize the rule followed in Idaho that lack of
consideration renders a deed void. Nor does Louisiana follow the same bona fide purchaser rule
applied in Idaho. The court in Brown observed as follows.
Neither fraud, nor want of consideration, nor secret equities between the parties,
who have placed on the public records a title valid upon its face, can be urged
against a bona fide purchaser for value, who has acted on the faith of such
recorded title.
It is also the law that all persons have constructive notice of the existence and
contents of a recorded instrument affecting immovable property; and where such
an instrument contains language that fairly puts a purchaser on inquiry as to the
title and he does not avail himself of the means and facilities at hand to obtain
knowledge of the true facts he is to be considered as having bought at his own risk
and peril.
Furthermore, as a condition precedent to good faith, a purchaser is not required to
examine the public records for the purpose of determining whether or not the
property's title is good and valid. Bad faith is not to be imputed to him merely
because an examination of the public records would have disclosed a defect in his
vendor's title.
Id. 11 So.2dat716.

Furthermore, the court in Brown determined there was consideration to support the deed
in the initial transaction challenged on appeal. No other state appellate court has cited the Brown
decision.
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Thus, the authorities relied upon by the Bank provide no persuasive reasoning sustaining
the Bank's argument that a void deed protects a good faith encumbrancer.
Fraud by Palmer

Finally, the Bank contends Palmer's conceded fraud cannot be considered when
determining whether a voidable deed should be set aside. The authorities cited by the Bank do
support is argument.
Appellate courts in Texas and Missouri hold that evidence of fraud will render a deed
voidable. A deed obtained by fraud is not absolutely void; rather, it is voidable and must be set
aside in a judicial proceeding maintained by the defrauded party. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d
923 (1976); Deaton v. Rush, 252 S.W.2d 1025 (1923); Meiners v. Texas Osage Coop. Royalty

Pool, Inc., 309 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Civ.App.-EI Paso 1958).
Missouri follows a rule similar to Texas.
We are mindful of the general rule that mereabsence of consideration is not
sufficient to warrant relief by way of equitable cancellation of a deed in the
absence of some additional circumstance creating an independent ground for
granting cancellation, such as fraud or undue influence. But where a person has
been induced to part with a thing of value for little or no consideration, equity will
seize upon the slightest circumstance of fraud, duress, or mistake for the purpose
of administering justice in the particular case.
We hold that the absence of consideration for the special warranty deed, coupled
with Blisard's misrepresentation that it was a quitclaim deed for the purpose of
establishing that the fence line had been in place for many years, supplied ample
grounds for the cancellation of the special warranty deed.

City a/Gainesville v. Gilliland, 718 S.W.2d 553, 580 (Mo.App. S.D. 1986)(citations omitted).
Although acknowledging Palmer committed fraud against Yost and the Harrises, the
Bank suggests such third-party fraud cannot be the basis of voiding a deed. The decision in City

a/Gainesville rejects the Bank's position.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

9

If a deed is void for lack of consideration, the presence of fraud is a non-issue. However,
in those states where lack of consideration renders a deed voidable, the presence of fraud will
result in judicial determination that the deed was void.
As the Missouri Appellate Court held above, "But where a person has been induced to
part with a thing of value for little or no consideration, equity will seize upon the slightest
circumstance of fraud ... for the purpose of administering justice in the particular case." Id. In
the City a/Gainesville, a third party's fraud - Mr. Blisard - was the basis for judicial cancellation
ofa deed.
Consequently, the presence of fraud by a third party may be sufficient grounds for
determining a deed should be voided.
Yost believed he paid the Harrises $800,000. Yost was defrauded by Palmer where Yost
did not in fact pay the Harrises $800,000. The Harrises were defrauded into initially believing
Yost had made the $800,000 payment. At the time of the delivery of the corrected quitclaim
deed, Darryl Harris was concerned about payment. Yost presented the fraudulent document
Palmer had prepared purportedly showing Bank of America held millions of dollars for Trigon,
which funds would be sufficient to cover Yost's consideration.
Accordingly, in those jurisdictions where lack of consideration renders a deed voidable
and not merely void, the presence of fraud surrounding the issuance of the deed leads to judicial
cancellation of the deed. Such cancellation would result regardless of whether the fraud was
committed by a third party. Cancellation of the con'ected quitclaim deed would eliminate the
Bank's position as a good faith encumbrancer because no title was conveyed to which the Bank's
interest could attach,
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C.

There was no delivery of the deed.
In part the Bank suggests that parol evidence is not admissible to challenge delivery of a

deed. The Bank's reliance on Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho 633, 80 P. 1117 (1905) is misplaced.
"Delivery in some form is absolutely essential" to the validity of a deed.
"[D]elivery includes surrender and acceptance, and both are necessary to its
completion." "[W]hether a deed has been delivered so as to pass title depends
upon the intention of the parties." "The mere placing of a deed in the hands of the
grantee does not necessarily constitute a delivery. The question is one of
intention: whether the deed was then intended by the parties to take effect
according to its terms." "[T]he evidence of delivery of a deed must come from
without the deed. In other words, a deed does not upon its face show delivery, and
therefore parol evidence is admissible to show such fact." "[T]he real test of the
delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to
divest himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered."
Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 116, 123, 138 P.3d 316,323 (2006)(citations omitted).

"A deed 'does not take effect as a deed until delivery with intent that it shall
operate. The intent with which it is delivered is important. This restricts or enlarges the
effect of the instrument. '" Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344-345, 179 P.3d 303,
307-308 (2008)(citations omitted). Parol evidence is admissible to determine the intent of
the grantor at the critical time of delivery.
Ignoring the salient facts of Darryl Harris' intent, the Bank reaches the erroneous
conclusion that, "The uncontroverted evidence can only be construed to show that Darryl
intended to deliver the Corrected Quitclaim Deed to Duane."
Pertinent to the question of the Harrises' intent are the following facts. The Harrises and
Yost intended to development the subject property under Triad-Harris, LLC. Title to the property
plmmed for development was to be held under that entity's name. No deed was prepared until the
first quitclaim deed in November 2008. That deed was unquestionably faulty in several respects,
including the grantee named as the Yost Trust and the signature only of Darryl Harris.
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Meanwhile, concerns about Yost's and the Harrises' investments with Trigon grew in
intensity and uncertainty. When Yost returned to Harris with the corrected quitclaim deed, Harris
was reluctant due to the concern over receiving actual payment for the property. Yost then
showed Harris the contrived statement from Bank of America purportedly showing Trigon had
millions of dollars available. Harris then took the deed and later signed it. Harris testified that he
signed the deed only upon assurance that payment would be made.
Under the above facts, Harris had no intention of relinquishing title to his property
without full payment. Harris did not intend to deliver the deed except on condition of full
payment. Satisfaction of payment was assured to Harris through fraud.
Accordingly, there was no delivery of the corrected quitclaim deed. The district court's
judgment should be reversed.

D.

Idaho Code § 32-912 applies.
The Bank recognizes that I.C. § 32-912 applies to void the corrected quitclaim deed.

However, the Bank maintains that various forms of estoppel work to prevent Christine Harris
from asserting the protections of the statute.
Estoppel can only apply where the conduct of the non-consenting spouse is consistent
with the validity of the disputed contract. See Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711, 779
P.2d 22,25 (Ct. App. 1989).
Quasi-Estoppel

"Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from successfully asserting a position inconsistent with
a previously-taken position, with knowledge of the facts and of its rights, to the detriment of the
person seeking to invoke it." Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 662, 962
P.2d 1041,1046 (1998).
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRlEF
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Christine Harris did not assert a position inconsistent with a previously-taken position.
She has always maintained that the corrected quitclaim deed was signed without her knowledge
and did not contain her signature. Indeed, the Bank cannot point to any facts showing it relied to
its detriment on some position taken by Christine Harris. Christine Harris was not a party to the
corrected quitclaim deed and did nothing to cause the Bank to think otherwise.
Judicial Estoppel

Curiously, the Bank suggests the default judgment the Harrises obtained against the
Yosts operates is some fashion as judicial estoppel to the Harrises' defense of § 32-912.
Judicial estoppel has no application to the present action.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits "a party from assuming a position in
one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent
proceeding .... " Generally when a litigant, through sworn statements, "obtains a
judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, by
repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations
or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party,
arising out of the same transaction or subject matter." "Because judicial estoppel
is an equitable doctrine existing to protect the dignity of the judicial process it is '
invoked by a court at its discretion."
Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748, 215 P.3d 457,468
(2009), quoting, Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLe, 143 Idaho 116, 121-22, 138 P.3d 316,321-22
(2006).

There has been no other proceeding involving the Harrises, the Yosts and the Bank. In
no other proceeding has Christine Harris taken the position that she signed the corrected
quitclaim deed.
Obtaining default judgment against the Yosts in the present action is not an event
invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel against the Harrises for claiming application of § 32912 against the Bank. Rules of procedure recognize that alternative and conflicting claims may
be raised without fear of judicial estoppel. LR.C.P. 8(e)(2). Under the Bank's analysis of judicial
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estoppel, its amended complaint against Robert Crandall for damages from his alleged violation
of notary obligations relating to the corrected quitclaim deed constitutes estoppel of its claims
against the Harrises and the Yosts.
Equitable Estoppel

Equitable estoppel is a doctrine used to prevent application of certain defenses such as
statutes oflimitation, Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 757 P.2d 188 (1987); Twin Falls Clinic
& Hasp. Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,644 P.2d 341 (1982), or the defense of parol evidence

and lack of agency to enforce an otherwise unenforceable agreement, Ogden v. Griffith, 149
Idaho 489,236 P.3d 1249 (2010).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that equitable estoppel applies only where there is
inequitable conduct by a party to a contract. Bunn v. Heritage Safe Co., 148 Idaho 760, 229 P.3d
365 (2010).
Neither Christine Harris nor Darryl Harris engaged in inequitable conduct as part of any
contract or agreement with the Bank. The Harrises have not asserted any inequitable defenses to
the Bank's claims. Christine Harris did not "conceal" the fact that her signature had been forged.
There was no issue about her signature on the corrected quitclaim deed until this action was
filed.
Although the Bank argues it could not have known about the forgery because the deed
had been notarized, the facts show otherwise. At a time prior to the signing of the corrected
quitclaim deed, the Harrises appeared in person at the Bank and signed deeds of trust that the
Bank notarized. Additionally, the Bank had on record a copy of the Harrises' account records
including Christine Harrises' signature. The Bank "could have known" that Christine Harris did
not sign the corrected quitclaim deed.
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The Bank makes much of the existence of a notary on the quitclaim deed. However, the
evidence is clear that Christine Harris did not sign the deed. The Bank's sole reliance on the
existence of a notary is a position taken at its own peril and not caused by the Harrises. The Bank
may have claim against the notary, but such claim does not result in equitable estoppel against
the Harrises.
Finally, for the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the Bank cannot assert estoppel
in any manner against the Harrises, because the Harrises took no action preceding execution and
recording of the corrected quitclaim deed on which estoppel can be based.
Where estoppel does not apply, the protections of I.C. § 32-912 are available to the
Harrises. The district court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to the Bank.
The district court's judgment should be reversed.

E.

The Bank's request for costs and attorney fees on appeal does not apply to the Harrises.
As part of the amended judgment, the district court granted the Bank an award of costs

and attorney fees against the Yosts. The Bank made no argument for an award of costs and
attorney fees against the Harrises.
On appeal, the Bank does not clarify that its request for costs and fees on appeal is
directed against the Yosts and not the Harrises. However, the Bank cites to the note and deed of
trust executed by the Yosts as authority for its request for costs and fees. Further, the Bank cites
I.C. § 12-120(3) as statutory authority for an award of fees.

To the extent the Bank is requested costs and fees on appeal against the Harrises, the
Harrises object to the Bank's request. The Harrises are not party to any contract with the Bank.
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The Harrises have no obligation under law or statute to pay costs and attorney fees to the BaIlic
The Harrises are not party to any commercial transaction with the Banlc
Accordingly, the Bank's request for costs and fees on appeal may be allowed as against
the Yosts, but cannot be allowed against the Harrises.

CONCLUSION
There are genuine Issues of material fact as to whether the Bank was a good faith
encumbrancer.
The corrected quitclaim deed is void for lack of consideration.
The corrected quitclaim deed is void in violation ofLC. § 32-912.
The corrected quitclaim deed was not delivered.
The district court's amended judgment should be reversed upon the grounds that the
corrected quitclaim deed is void.
Alternatively, the district court's amended judgment should be vacated upon the grounds
that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Bank is a good faith encumbrancer.
Dated this ~ day of July 2012.

KIPP L. Manwaring
Attorney for the Appellants
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